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ARGUMENTS 
I. PLAINTIFF PRESERVED HIS OBJECTION TO INSTRUCTION NO, 19 
Defendant Phillips concedes that Plaintiff requested an 
instruction based on Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 
(Utah App. 1992) (Appellee brief at 5) . Defendant is incorrect that 
Plaintiff dropped (or appeared to drop) that request for 
instruction. Mr. Jensen actually objected to Instruction No. 19 on 
two bases: 
MR. COOK: Your Honor, this, and in another instruction I will 
refer to, the Court has used these instructions, neither of 
which were propounded by counsel regarding business invitee. 
The business invitee distinction has been abolished in Utah by 
higher courts, it rather is a comparative standard that is now 
used. 
Additionally, Instruction 19 states that if the owner has 
knowledge of such danger, et cetera -- well, under Canfield 
when evidence is presented or the theory of the case is that 
the owner took reasonable precautions for expectable acts of 
third parties would create a dangerous condition, actual 
knowledge is not required, and we have a copy of Canfield 
stating that actual knowledge is not required, it is presumed. 
In this case, we had expectable acts of third parties and 
conditions created by the defendant...Actual knowledge is not 
required. [Emphasis added]. 
Transcript at 108-109, included in Appendix H. 
Thus, it is clear from the record that Instruction 19 was 
objected to by Mr. Jensen on two bases: The business invitee 
distinction and, secondly, the actual knowledge issue. 
Phillips is clearly not correct in arguing that 
"reasonable care was the only relevant consideration" and that Mr. 
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Jensen "voiced no objection to the foregoing" instruction. 
(Appellee Brief at 7). This ignores the entire colloquy on pages 
108-112 of the transcript, as noted above and also set out in 
Appendix A to this brief. 
Utah law requires that "an objection to an instruction must be 
sufficient and precise to alert the trial court to all claimed 
error and to give the judge an opportunity to make any corrections 
deemed necessary." Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 830 P.2d 
270, 271 (Utah 1992) . Clearly, given the discussion in which Mr. 
Jensen repeatedly objected to the actual notice requirement, the 
trial court was aware that Mr. Jensen wished a Canfield instruction 
regarding knowledge. This is the same argument made on appeal. 
Indeed, Phillips admits on page 7 of its brief that: 
Plaintiff countered with an instruction based on Canfield v. 
Albertson' s, Inc. , 841 P. 2d at 1226, dispensing with the 
notice requirement in cases where the "store owner, its 
agents, or employees create or are responsible for the 
dangerous condition." The trial court refused to give the 
defendant's notice instruction. 
For Phillips to argue that the objection was not preserved 
belies the transcript in the trial court and its own appellate 
brief. 
II. BECAUSE DEFENDANT ARGUED NOTICE A CANFIELD 
INSTRUCTION WAS NECESSARY 
Phillips states that the trial court "viewed this as a case 
where the property owner could not possibly contest notice, since 
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it was the one who created the hazardous condition (assuming there 
was one). The trial court's decision not to give the notice 
instruction is not at issue." Appellee's brief at 10. 
Mr. Jensen begs to differ. Defense counsel argued that the 
Phillips employee on duty, Paul Hatch, had no notice of the 
problem. (T. 124, line 6-12): 
There is nothing for Paul [Hatch] to do in this situation 
because he didn't know there was a problem. . . . [Mr. Jensen] didn't 
report the situation. ...How can we correct something if we didn't 
know about it? 
The purpose of Canfield was to remove this requirement of 
knowledge argued by defense counsel, i.e., "to relieve the 
Plaintiff of the requirement of proving actual or constructive 
notice in such instances as to effect more equatable balance in 
regard to the burdens of proof." Canfield at 227 (Citations 
omitted). 
This case is no different from Canfield. 
Regarding Canfield v. Albertson's, Phillips notes in its brief 
that "Albertson's attempted to defend by arguing that it had no 
notice of the specific lettuce leaf upon which plaintiff slipped 
and fell." Appellant brief at 11. This is precisely what occurred 
in this case: Phillips attempted to argue that it had no notice of 
the conditions upon which plaintiff slipped and fell. (T.124, line 
6-12) . 
In its brief, Phillips states "Plaintiff agrees that the trial 
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court's instruction on reasonable care was correct..." (Appellee's 
brief 11) . This is not true. Jensen agreed that the standard was 
one of reasonable care. He did not agree that the instruction was 
correct. As admitted by Phillips in its brief (page 7), Mr. 
Jensen asked for a Canfield instruction on the issue of knowledge. 
Thus, Phillips' implication that plaintiff wanted only the 
reasonable care instruction is contradicted by its own brief and 
the transcript at 108-109. 
III. FAILURE TO GIVE THE INSTRUCTION WAS HARMFUL ERROR BECAUSE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUED NOTICE AND KNOWLEDGE 
Jensen alleges that the "jury was never told that notice was 
an issue." (Appellants brief at 11). This is not true. Phillips 
repeatedly argued notice in this situation: 
There was nothing for Paul [Hatch] to do in this situation 
because he didn't feel there was a problem. ...We didn't 
know. How can we correct something if we didn't know about 
it? 
(T. 124, line 6-12). 
For Phillips to state that notice was not argued at the trial 
level is incorrect. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF COSTS IN EXCESS OF THAT ALLOWED 
BY STATUTE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Phillips seeks to be paid for the deposition "appearance fee" 
paid to the expert witness. However, as noted in Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), where the expert witnesses were 
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also paid in excess of the subpoena rate: 
There is a distinction to be understood between 
legitimate and taxable "costs" and other "expenses," of 
litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not 
properly taxable as costs. Consistent with that 
distinction, the courts hold that expert witnesses cannot 
be awarded extra compensation unless the statute 
expressly provides. 
Frampton at 774. 
No statute authorizes this expense for the expert witness to 
be included in the judgment. While URCP 26(b)(4)(C) allows a 
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery, Phillips 
has failed to note any statute which authorizes this fee to be 
included in the taxable costs. The "Utah Supreme Court has defined 
costs to mean those fees which are required to be paid to the court 
and to witnesses, AND for which the statutes authorize to be 
included in the judgment." Morgan, citing Frampton, at 774 
(emphasis added). It is a two part test: Not only must the fees 
be required, but the statute must authorize them to be included in 
the judgment. The statute does not authorize Dr. Paulos' expert 
fee to be included in the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff preserved his objection to Instruction No. 19 in his 
request for a Canfield instruction. Any error was not harmless, as 
notice was an issue and argued by Phillips. The trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding the deposition appearance fee inasmuch 
as no statute authorizes payment of that fee. 
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DATED this f day of September, 1994. 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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Mr. Cook, have you had occasion to look at those? 
MR. COOK: I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have you, Mr. Dal ton? 
MR. DALTON: I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The procedure that we'll follow, I 
have numbered the proposed jury instructions. The first 
thing we would like to talk about is the exceptions to those 
instructions, and I would like you to do that by referring to 
the number and any comments that you have on them, referring 
to any case law, Mr. Cook, and then you the same thing, 
Mr. Dal ton, and then we will talk about exceptions to the 
Court's failure to give your proposed jury instructions. So 
let's start with you, Mr. Cook. 
MR. COOK: Thank you, your Honor. Can we turn to 
Instruction No. 19? 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. COOK: Your Honor, this, and in another 
instruction I will refer to, the Court has used these 
instructions, neither of which were propounded by counsel 
regarding business invitee. The business invitee distinction 
has been abolished in Utah by higher courts, it rather is as 
a comparative standard that is now used. 
Additionally, Instruction 19 states that if the 
owner has a knowledge of such danger, et cetera — well, 
under Canfield. when evidence is presented or the theory of 
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THE COURT: I don't think that's the case, except 
in the case of tenant and landlord and that's as far as that 
distinction goes. It does not extend beyond tenant and 
landlord. There is a tenant and landlord case that 
essentially distinguishes and abolishes that distinction, 
but it does not extend to the business invitees nor does it 
extend to the trespassers. 
MR. COOK: Okay. 
MR. DALTON: I would like to speak to 20. In 
fact, that is an instruction I requested. I think that's 
required under that Peats vs. Commercial Security Bank 
building that I referred to the Court. So I am happy with 20 
and 21. 
THE COURT: I wi11 note your objection. I will 
give you a chance to look and see what you can give me as far 
as case law. If the only case law you have is the one 
dealing with landlord and tenant, that I'm not interested in. 
MR. COOK: Okay. 
THE COURT: Because it didn't do that. 
MR. COOK: Instruction No. 27 appears, your 
Honor, to be a Biswell instruction, and I note the copies you 
gave us are the ones without citations on them. 
THE COURT: That's the one out of MUJI. 
MR. COOK: We would encourage the Court either to 
use our Biswell instruction, which actually I thought I had 
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back out, salt that spot right there, take a shovel, break it 
up, put it down the drain. Five, ten minutes, he is on his 
way again, no problem. Again, it's not our fault if he 
didn't do that. We can't be there every second to watch over 
what he's doing. We are not babysitters. The fact is, he 
didn't move the truck, he didn't go for help, and there was 
nothing for Paul to do in this situation because he didn't 
know there was a problem. You see, even after Mr. Jensen 
injured himself, he didn't go to Paul. He didn't report the 
situation. He didn't come and tell us, "Look, you have got a 
problem over there." He loaded up, called the dispatcher to 
say he was done, went on his way. We didn't know. 
How can we correct something if we didn't know 
about it? It's his responsibility to come tell us if there 
is a problem. Somebody else might encounter it. You would 
think if there had been a big problem, he would have told us, 
even after the fact. Now, that's assuming that there was a 
problem, because you have heard testimony from people who 
were in that bay that very morning that they didn't even 
consider it a problem. Paul Hatch was one of them. He stood 
in the very place that Mr. Jensen said he slipped and he ran 
the manual meter reading on the pump there and he doesn't 
remember having a problem. 
Now, of course he is there every day or he works 
there, but you also heard the proffer, the testimony by 
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